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The Freedom of the Will

by Jonathan Edwards

Publication

Publisher
Soli Deo Gloria
Print status
Out of stock

The Physical Book

Binding
Hardcover
Dust jacket
Yes
Total pages
364 pages
ISBN-13
9781573580335

Reference

Notes
Full title: A Careful and Strict Inquiry into the Modern Prevailing Notions of That Freedom of Will, Which Is Supposed to Be Essential to Moral Agency, Vertue and Vice, Reward and Punishment, Praise and Blame. Edwards's principal philosophical-theological treatise, aimed chiefly at Arminian and Arminian-leaning ("Chubb") accounts of the will; R. C. Sproul called it "the most important theological work ever published in America." This edition was lithographed from the Thomas Nelson (London, 1845) printing, first reprinted by Soli Deo Gloria in 1996 and most recently in 2021. Distinct from the critical edition edited by Paul Ramsey as Volume 1 of Yale University Press's The Works of Jonathan Edwards, also catalogued here.
Publisher page
View at publisher

Contents

  • Part I: Wherein Are Explained and Stated Various Terms and Things Belonging to the Subject of the Ensuing Discourse
    • Section I. Concerning the Nature of the Will
    • Section II. Concerning the Determination of the Will
    • Section III. Concerning the Meaning of the Terms, Necessity, Impossibility, Inability, &c. and of Contingence
    • Section IV. Of the Distinction of Natural and Moral Necessity, and Inability
    • Section V. Concerning the Notion of Liberty, and of Moral Agency
  • Part II: Wherein It Is Considered Whether There Is or Can Be Any Sort of Freedom of Will, as That Wherein Arminians Place the Essence of the Liberty of All Moral Agents
    • Section I. Showing the Manifest Inconsistence of the Arminian Notion of Liberty of Will, Consisting in the Will's Self-Determining Power
    • Section II. Several Supposed Ways of Evading the Foregoing Reasoning Considered
    • Section III. Whether Any Event Whatsoever, and Volition in Particular, Can Come to Pass Without a Cause of Its Existence
    • Section IV. Whether Volition Can Arise Without a Cause, Through the Activity of the Nature of the Soul
    • Section V. Showing That the Things Asserted in These Evasions Are Impertinent, and Arminian Writers Are Obliged to Talk Inconsistently
    • Section VI. Concerning the Will Determining in Things Which Are Perfectly Indifferent in the View of the Mind
    • Section VII. Concerning the Notion of Liberty of Will, Consisting in Indifference
    • Section VIII. Concerning the Supposed Liberty of the Will, as Opposite to All Necessity
    • Section IX. Of the Connexion of the Acts of the Will with the Dictates of the Understanding
    • Section X. Volition Necessarily Connected with the Influence of Motives
    • Section XI. The Evidence of God's Certain Foreknowledge of the Volitions of Moral Agents
    • Section XII. God's Certain Foreknowledge Inconsistent with Such a Contingence of Volitions as Is Without All Necessity
    • Section XIII. Whether Connected with Anything Antecedent or Not, Volitions Must Be Necessary in Such a Sense as to Overthrow Arminian Liberty
  • Part III: Wherein Is Inquired Whether Any Such Liberty of Will as Arminians Hold Be Necessary to Moral Agency, Virtue, Praise, and Dispraise
    • Section I. God's Moral Excellency Necessary, Yet Virtuous and Praiseworthy
    • Section II. The Acts of the Will of the Human Soul of Jesus Christ, Necessarily Holy, Yet Truly Virtuous and Praiseworthy
    • Section III. The Case of Fallen Man in General Proves Moral Necessity and Inability to Be Consistent with Blameworthiness
    • Section IV. Command and Obligation to Obedience, Consistent with Moral Inability to Obey
    • Section V. Sincerity of Desires and Endeavours, Supposed to Excuse Non-Performance of Things in Themselves Good, Considered
    • Section VI. Liberty of Indifference Not Only Not Necessary to Virtue, But Utterly Inconsistent with It
    • Section VII. Arminian Notions of Moral Agency Inconsistent with All Influence of Motive and Inducement
  • Part IV: Wherein the Chief Grounds of the Reasonings of Arminians in Support of the Aforementioned Notions of Liberty Are Considered
    • Section I. The Essence of the Virtue and Vice of Dispositions of the Heart Lies Not in Their Cause, but Their Nature
    • Section II. The Falseness of That Metaphysical Notion of Action and Agency Generally Entertained by Defenders of the Arminian Doctrine
    • Section III. Why Some Think It Contrary to Common Sense to Suppose Necessary Things Worthy of Praise or Blame
    • Section IV. It Is Agreeable to Common Sense to Suppose Moral Necessity Consistent with Praise and Blame, Reward and Punishment
    • Section V. Concerning the Objection That This Scheme Renders Means and Endeavours After Virtue Vain, and Men Mere Machines
    • Section VI. Concerning the Objection That This Doctrine Agrees with the Stoical Doctrine of Fate, and the Opinions of Mr. Hobbes
    • Section VII. Concerning the Necessity of the Divine Will